– Morality confuses altruism with cooperation – Cooperation requires the situated ability to choose partners – I propose a game theoretical definition of these concepts – I provide evidence from anthropology, history and cryptocurrency
Author: Jose Maanmieli
Abstract: : I propose a clear definition of money, as opposed to credit, through a biological distinction between the concepts of cooperation and altruism. I argue that these aspects of animal sociality are often confused because they are evaluated from a sociocentric perspective. Objectively speaking, the function of a monetary token is to mediate interactions that are more constructive than reciprocal altruism, synergistic interactions involving partner-choice and non-additive benefits. This focus on proximate mechanisms explains the challenges encountered by monetary theorists, who typically emphasise the utility of a token or its symbolism. The invention of Bitcoin provides empirical support. Indeed, the value of bitcoins does not come from any intrinsic utility nor does it come from an institution. This form of digital money has simply emerged on the internet, an open network akin to the ecological environment in which trade has evolved. Like Bitcoin and other cryptocurrencies, money is naturally created by humans as a signal of cooperative intent. This potential for indirect exchanges is then seized by altruistic systems of reproduction that transform money into credit. The understanding of money thus helps elucidate the nature of human society and our ability to cooperate indirectly.
Keywords: game theory, partner-choice, morality, social evolution, credit-money, bitcoin
– We introduce a view of mental illness as a conflict with society – Psychiatry also reflects a conflict between worldviews – The existence of ‘society’ is questionable – Therefore, we should understand those who cannot adapt to it
Authors: Jose Maanmieli and Karoliina Maanmieli
Abstract: Some words have the power to define what is real. This article introduces a comprehensive view of mental illness as an inner conflict with those words. We suggest that individuals are sometimes unable to assimilate the narratives most human beings live by because the social realities they portray are abstract, incoherent and conflicting. We do this through a constructive criticism of Open Dialogue, an innovative, celebrated approach to mental health care that resembles family therapy. Open Dialogue is important due to its situated focus on human relationships. However, the approach adheres to the metaphysical narrative of social constructionism, which we argue is but another form of rationalism that competes with the rationalism of the biomedical model. Both approaches effectively disregard embodied experience, individual decision-making and the sciences of behaviour because they have a basis in societal norms. We illustrate our case through the psychosis stories gathered in a unique, minimally edited book, which we contrast with case examples of Open Dialogue. Our analysis shows that epistemic and therapeutic value should not be seen as opposites. Questioning our most fundamental assumptions reveals that the person in crisis has a lot to say about life’s biggest questions, and opens the door to a genuinely open dialogue.
Keywords: morality, psychiatry, Open Dialogue, decision-making, family, rationalism, social realities
– Kin terms appear to be a language universal – They are transmitted through child-directed speech – They conflate natural concepts and social concepts in our minds – They are the moral essence of human cultural evolution
Author: Jose Maanmieli
Abstract: Why do we call our parents mother and father? Why do we call ourselves these general words as parents? These personal questions have not sufficiently drawn the attention of linguists and psychologists, yet any account of language and human cognition must be able to provide a good answer. Indeed, our minds have evolved and develop in a social setting that is primarily governed by norms of kinship. This article demonstrates how those norms encapsulate the relationship between language and reality, individual and society. It suggests that the use of kin terms is characterised by a conflation of address and reference that corresponds to a cognitive conflation of social and natural concepts. This analysis rests on a biological view of language, morality and human sociality. From this grounded perspective, I integrate findings across the behavioural sciences. I argue that myth has a basis in child-directed speech, and that child-directed speech is a means of socialisation, not so much a means to help children learn to speak or relate to others. I also discuss the theoretical issues that result from this lack of metalinguistic awareness, issues that go back to the beginnings of philosophy. Because nature is prior to nurture, and the concepts of parents and kin appear first in life, understanding the nature of these concepts elucidates central problems, from the origin of societies to the current questioning of gender and parenting roles.
Keywords: child-directed speech, evolutionary social psychology, language socialisation, self-deception, definition of morality, origins of language, philosophy
– We illustrate how scientists can confuse society with nature – Institutions resemble pretend play – The nature of language makes institutional reality appear objective – We propose a definition of morality as a linguistic cognitive conflation
Authors: Jose Maanmieli and Karoliina Maanmieli
Abstract: The nature of reality is an old philosophical question, yet not nearly as old as the myths of different cultures around marriage and kinship. We can assume that these ancient, foundational institutions have deeply shaped our perception of reality. Here we provide an answer that integrates biology, psychology, anthropology and linguistics. Simply put, institutions are intersubjective games, and our ontological confusion around them evolved due to their reproductive function. This argument involves a precise understanding of morality as a deceptive linguistic socialisation device that is distinct from other forms of normativity. More specifically, we argue that what philosopher John Searle has called institutional ‘facts’, such as a piece of paper being money, should instead be regarded as subjective and nonfactual. Central to these considerations is the very definition of human society, and how its moral, tribalistic nature goes unnoticed because it is registered in language itself, limiting our self-understanding. We demonstrate this limitation by closely examining a recent book chapter on the origins of language which, influenced by Searle, uses the institution of marriage as an example of serious or objective institutional practice and discusses how children learn to participate in it. Searle’s own conceptual framework also proves useful in illustrating how kinship and moral socialisation form the basis of social realities.
Keywords: social reality, prescription, kinship system, definition of morality, child psychology, cognitive conflation