The prefix meta- is often used to signal a higher level of discourse—a way of stepping beyond an ordinary subject to talk about it from an external vantage point. But how real is this elevation? Often, meta- creates an illusion of depth rather than adding actual substance.
Meta-words are just words
Consider the sentence:
- “A dog is an animal.”
→ This is a normal linguistic statement that describes the world. - “The word ‘dog’ is a noun.”
→ Now we are not just using dog but talking about the word itself. This is often considered a meta-linguistic statement because we are not referring to an actual dog but to language itself.
Now, let us step further:
- “The sentence ‘The word ‘dog’ is a noun’ is a meta-linguistic statement.”
→ Now we are not just describing the word dog, but classifying the previous sentence as meta-linguistic. Some might call this meta-meta-linguistics.
At this point, what has changed? Are we really at a new level, or are we just playing a labelling game? The original statement already contained all the information. The introduction of meta- levels does not add depth—it just reorganises the same content into a hierarchy that serves no real purpose.
This is not just a quirk of language. It is a pattern deeply embedded in philosophy.
The narcissism of rising above
Philosophy is perhaps the discipline most addicted to meta-. Instead of discussing concepts directly, it often seeks to reframe them at a higher level:
- Instead of defining meaning, philosophers ask, “What do we mean by ‘meaning’?”
- Instead of seeking knowledge, as science does, philosophy seeks to study knowledge itself—‘epistemology,’ a kind of meta-knowledge.
This tendency creates an endless cycle of abstraction, if not self-contradiction. The philosopher does not merely think; he thinks about thinking. He does not merely pursue truth; he seeks the truth of whether truth can be pursued at all. Each step claims to move upwards, but in reality, it moves sideways, or against itself.
Why does this happen? Because philosophy, I submit, is often not a method of inquiry, but a psychological defence. By insisting in placing themselves above, philosophers avoid being questioned on the same terms as everyone else. Philosophy places itself outside the system it critiques. This is a kind of narcissism—the need to always rise above, never be subject to the same scrutiny it applies to everything else.
Psychoanalysis: the science of philosophy
Unlike philosophy, which tries to step above everything, psychoanalysis—at least in its original form—digs below. If philosophy is concerned with endless abstraction, psychoanalysis is concerned with the unconscious drives that lead people to engage in abstraction in the first place.
This is what makes Jean Laplanche’s work so significant. Unlike Freud, who often strayed into speculative, philosophical territory, Laplanche sought to ground psychoanalysis back in the study of human behaviour. But I would take this further: psychoanalysis, when properly understood, is the science of philosophy. It does not merely produce theories about human thought; it examines the psychological motivations behind the creation of those theories.
In this sense, psychoanalysis does not belong in the meta- tradition at all. It does not need to rise above psychology—it simply needs to be psychology, but one that includes the unconscious as part of its object of study. This is why Freud’s term, ‘meta-psychology’ is such an unfortunate one. It suggests that psychoanalysis is engaged in the same kind of abstraction as philosophy—stepping above psychology rather than working within it. But if psychoanalysis is to be a real science, it must not claim to be beyond psychology; it must simply be psychology and remain in touch with empirical and clinical data.
Closing the circle
The example of dog and meta-linguistics shows that meta- distinctions often create the illusion of a new level when, in fact, they are just rearrangements of the same information. The example of philosophy shows how meta- is used as an intellectualising defence, a way to avoid being on the same plane as ordinary discourse. And the case of psychoanalysis shows how this illusion has infiltrated fields that aim to be scientific.
But psychoanalytic theory, at its best, is not another meta- discipline. Psychoanalysis can explain why people engage in this suspiciously complex and detached meta- discourse. It does not step above; it looks within. And in doing so, it suggests that the meta- game is not a natural progression of thought but a structure of avoidance, a linguistic mask that conceals the reality of our minds.