Social destructionism: Psychosis and the limits of dialogue

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Authors: Jose Maanmieli and Karoliina Maanmieli

Abstract: Some words have the power to define what is real. This article introduces a comprehensive view of mental illness as an inner conflict with those words. We suggest that individuals are sometimes unable to assimilate the narratives most human beings live by because the social realities they portray are abstract, incoherent and conflicting. We do this through a constructive criticism of Open Dialogue, an innovative, celebrated approach to mental health care that resembles family therapy. Open Dialogue is important due to its situated focus on human relationships. However, the approach adheres to the metaphysical narrative of social constructionism, which we argue is but another form of rationalism that competes with the rationalism of the biomedical model. Both approaches effectively disregard embodied experience, individual decision-making and the sciences of behaviour because they have a basis in societal norms. We illustrate our case through the psychosis stories gathered in a unique, minimally edited book, which we contrast with case examples of Open Dialogue. Our analysis shows that epistemic and therapeutic value should not be seen as opposites. Questioning our most fundamental assumptions reveals that the person in crisis has a lot to say about life’s biggest questions, and opens the door to a genuinely open dialogue.


Keywords: morality, psychiatry, Open Dialogue, decision-making, family, rationalism, social realities

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The nature of kinship terms: From dad and mum to god and society

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Author: Jose Maanmieli

Abstract: Why do we call our parents mother and father? Why do we call ourselves these general words around children? These personal questions have not sufficiently drawn the attention of linguists and psychologists, yet any account of language and human cognition must be able to provide a good answer. Indeed, our minds have evolved and develop in a social setting that is primarily governed by norms of kinship. This article demonstrates how those norms encapsulate the relationship between language and reality, individual and society. I suggest that the use of kinship terms is characterised by a self-deceptive conflation of address and reference, which corresponds to a cognitive conflation of particular and universal meanings. This analysis requires a distinction between acts of address and reference that is consistent with a biological view of the individual. From this grounded perspective, I argue that 1) Mother and Father are elementary mythical characters, 2) myth has a basis in child-directed speech, and 3) child-directed speech is mainly a means to transmit societal norms, not so much a means to help children learn to speak or relate to others. I also discuss the conceptual issues in developmental linguistics that result from this lack of metalinguistic awareness, issues that go back to the beginnings of philosophy. Because nature is prior to nurture, and the concepts of parents and kin appear first in life, understanding the nature of these concepts elucidates central problems, from those of epistemology to the current questioning of gender and parenting roles.


Keywords: child-directed speech, evolutionary psychology, language socialisation, self-deception, definition of morality, origins of language, philosophy

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Children’s pretence: A scientific perspective on social reality

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Author: Jose Maanmieli

Abstract: The nature of reality is an old philosophical question, yet not nearly as old as the myths of different cultures around marriage and kinship. We can assume that these foundational institutions have deeply shaped our perception of reality, since they probably date to the origin of our species. Here we provide an answer that integrates biology, psychology, anthropology and linguistics. Simply put, institutions do not belong in a descriptive, scientific notion of reality, and our ontological confusion around them evolved due to its reproductive function. This argument involves a precise understanding of morality as a deceptive linguistic socialisation device that is distinct from other forms of normativity. More specifically, we argue that what philosopher John Searle has called institutional ‘facts’, such as a piece of paper being money, should instead be regarded as strictly subjective and nonfactual. Central to these considerations is the very definition of human society, and how its moral, tribalistic nature goes unnoticed because it is registered in language itself, limiting our self-understanding. We demonstrate this limitation by closely examining a recent book chapter on the social origins of language which, influenced by Searle, uses the institution of marriage as an example of serious or objective institutional practice and discusses how children learn to participate in it. Searle’s own conceptual framework also proves useful in illustrating how kinship and moral socialisation form the basis of social realities.


Keywords: social reality, prescription, kinship system, definition of morality, child psychology, cognitive conflation

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